









The reforms made in the early 1980s profoundly changed
the structure and functioning of the health sector in Chile in
both the private and the public subsectors. In spite of the
considerable advances made since 1990, however, the pub-
lic-private configuration resulting from those reforms has
not allowed the shortcomings in terms of resource alloca-
tion and the access of the population to health services to be
overcome. A proposal for reform of the sector should be
aimed at developing mechanisms to raise the efficiency and
efficacy of the resources allocated to it, as well as incorpo-
rating and improving solidarity-based mechanisms which
will help to tackle and solve the problems of health service
access afflicting a substantial part of the population. This
dual challenge is by no means easy, since it is necessary to
cope with growing demand in a context of shortage of re-
sources. The article describes the Chilean financing model
and proposes that the present public-private configuration
of the health sector must be redefined in order to make pos-
sible greater solidarity in financing, reduce the problem of
adverse selection of risks, and permit better linkages be-
tween the private and public subsectors, both in the field of
financing and in the provision of health services.
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I
Organization of the health sector
The reforms initiated in the early 1980s changed the
structure and functioning of the health sector in
Chile. In particular, the creation in 1981 of Health
Insurance Institutions (Isapres) allowed the private
sector to begin to play a more active role in health
sector finance.
The main reforms made at that time were: i) the
establishment of the National Health Fund (FONASA),
a financial institution for collecting, administering
and distributing State resources for the health sector;
ii) the creation of Health Insurance Institutions
(Isapres); iii) the decentralization of the National
System of Health Services (SNSS) into 27 area
health services covering the national territory, each
one providing health attention through systems made
up of hospitals of different levels of complexity,
urban and rural outpatient clinics and rural medical
aid posts, and iv) the decentralization of primary
health attention.
As a result of these reforms, the Chilean health
system now has a dual structure under which the
public and private subsectors both carry out func-
tions in the financing (insurance schemes) and pro-
duction of health services.1
II
Features of the Chilean model
The main sources of finance are: i) the compulsory
health insurance contributions of all dependent work-
ers and pensioners, equivalent to 7% of taxable in-
come; ii) financial resources from the national
budget, mainly channelled through FONASA. In addi-
tion, although there are no systematic statistical data
on the direct supplementary payments that users
make when they use the private services, such pay-
ments to private and public suppliers have become a
by no means insignificant source of funds.
One of the most outstanding features of the
Chilean system is that the health insurance contribu-
tions can be paid into either of the two health sys-
tems, which operate side by side but on very
different principles. Thus, contributors can choose
between the public health service insurance system
(FONASA) or the private health insurance schemes
(the Isapres). If the compulsory contributions are
paid into FONASA, the contributor and his dependants
will be enrolled in the public health system. If he
chooses to pay into an Isapre, the contributor forms
part of the private health system.
FONASA has a dual role. On the one hand, it
acts as an agency which collects, administers and
allocates public resources, while on the other it acts
as a public health insurance scheme representing
contributors and their dependants. In its role as an
insurance scheme, it operates like a traditional social
security system, as the benefits supplied are not
linked to the contributions paid. In principle, every
beneficiary has access to the same package of bene-
fits, whatever his level of contributions. In this
sense, FONASA incorporates financial mechanisms for
the redistribution of income from the richer to the
poorer sectors. Together with this income redistribu-
tion, it also applies the solidarity typical of a health
insurance system that serves both the healthy and
the sick.
Persons classified as indigent, who cannot pay
contributions, are beneficiaries of the public system
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1 Regulation of the health system is the responsibility of the
Ministry of Health, in accordance with the Health Code, which
covers all matters relating to the promotion, protection and re-
covery of the health of the population. In addition, in 1990 the
Government set up the Superintendency of Health Insurance
Institutions: a quasi-autonomous public body responsible for
supervising and monitoring the Isapres.
and thus part of the financial responsibility of
FONASA, just like regular contributors and their de-
pendants. Indigent beneficiaries receive free atten-
tion in the primary health care clinics run by the
municipalities or, in more complicated cases, in hos-
pitals that form part of the public system (the “insti-
tutional” modality). Contributors and their
dependants can receive attention in the public health
system or be treated by private suppliers through the
“free choice” modality offered by FONASA, in which
case they must make a co-payment from their own
pocket for the services provided.2
The network of suppliers under the institutional
modality consists of the health services belonging to
the SNSS, which come under the Ministry of Health,
and the local primary health clinics, which come un-
der the municipalities. At present, around 75% of the
hospital beds in the country belong to the SNSS. Un-
der the free choice modality, beneficiaries can use
the services of any private suppliers officially regis-
tered with FONASA.
As regards the private system, the Isapres act as
insurance companies offering health insurance under
a contract which defines the degree of coverage and
types of benefits for the individual subscriber or the
subscriber and his family unit (spouse, children or
other dependants). These contracts operate like an in-
dividual insurance policy: the benefits offered vary
according to the premium paid and the medical risk
category of the insured person(s).3 Thus, two persons
paying the same contributions but belonging to dif-
ferent age cohorts (which mean different medical
risks) receive different levels of coverage and bene-
fits. The contracts with the beneficiaries last for one
year, after which the Isapres have the right to change
their coverage and cost.4 Generally speaking, for a
given level of medical risk the amounts refundable
and the maximum levels of coverage increase in pro-
portion to the premium paid.
It is calculated that there are currently over
8,000 different health insurance plans available on
the market (Celedón and Oyarzo, 1998). This is be-
cause, as the contributions are predetermined by the
Isapres, the latter adjust the plans they offer as a
function of the contributions and medical risks of
their clients.5 As we shall see below, this multiplicity
of health plans obviously has important effects on
the capacity of users to choose the right plans and
thus reduces the efficiency of resource allocation.
The plans offered by the Isapres must incorpo-
rate all the types of health attention offered by
FONASA. What differentiates one health contract from
another is the degree of financial coverage of the at-
tention received (i.e., the size of the co-payment to
be made by the user) and the inclusion of types of at-
tention over and above those offered by FONASA. The
levels of financial coverage are determined in line
with scales of charges fixed by the Isapres, which do
not always reflect the market value of the types of at-
tention in question. If the gap between the prices
fixed by the insurers and those charged by the suppli-
ers widens, this increases the financial burden on the
user, because of the larger co-payment he must
make.
The network of suppliers of the system of
Isapres consists mainly of private suppliers: either in-
dependent or contractually linked with the Isapres.
Generally speaking, there is no integrated system
combining the financing and supply of attention
(along the lines of the Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions (HMOs) in the United States, for example); in-
stead, the Isapres tend to reimburse the payments
made by users for health attention, subject to the es-
tablished ceilings of the coverage provided.
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2 Higher-income contributors who receive treatment in estab-
lishments belonging to the National Health Service must make a
co-payment. Beneficiaries in group A (indigents), as well as
those in group B (persons whose income does not exceed the
minimum wage), are treated free in public establishments.
Those who are in group C (with an income that exceeds the
minimum wage by not more than 40%) must make a
co-payment of 10%, while those in group D (all higher in-
comes) must make a co-payment of 20%.
3 In reality, there are two types of Isapres: open and closed.
Open Isapres operate like insurance companies, with the insur-
ance provided depending on the premium paid and the individ-
ual risk category of the assured. Closed Isapres usually have
contracts with well-defined groups of persons, generally trade
unions or workers in the same firm, so that the medical risk
implicit in the scheme offered is of a collective nature and is a
function of the risk category of the group of members.
4 In the event of disagreement, the Superintendency of Isapres
is empowered to act as a binding arbitrator between the Isapres
and their clients. The powers of the Superintendency in this
respect are naturally limited to those laid down in the corre-
sponding legislation.
5 This phenomenon is due to the fact that the compulsory con-
tribution of 7% of taxable income determines the prices of the
policies in a manner which is exogenous to the insurance
market, and the insurers must configure the insurance coverage
offered as a function of a given price but different medical
risks. The great variety of plans is therefore due partly to the
mixed public-private nature of the current situation.
III
Coverage and financing of
the health system
In 1997 the public health subsector represented ap-
proximately 2.7% of GDP while the Isapre subsector
represented 1.7%6 (table 1). As regards population
coverage, in the same year approximately 64% of the
population was covered by FONASA and 26% were
members of Isapres.7
In the financing of the public health subsector,
the relative importance of the fiscal contribution has
been growing in recent years, so that in 1997 it repre-
sented 50% of FONASA’s income. As a proportion of
GDP, this contribution has practically doubled since
the first administration of the Democratic Coalition
(the “Concertación”), rising from 0.7% in 1989 to
1.3% in 1997 (table 1).
The compulsory health insurance contributions
are the second source of finance of the public
subsector. Although their relative weight went
down slightly in the 1990s, in 1997 they represented
32% of total income, which, together with the
fiscal contribution, accounted for nearly 82% of total
finance, the remaining 18% being made up of the
co-payments by FONASA beneficiaries and other
revenue.
In the Isapre system the main source of finance
is the contributions (premiums) paid by members,
which accounted for an average of 93% between
1990 and 1997. Most of the remainder –an average
of approximately 4% of total income between 1990
and 1997– is made up of the sale of voluntary plans
supplementary to the plans purchased with the com-
pulsory contributions. The fiscal contribution reflects
the subsidies received by Isapre members, especially
the “extra 2%” subsidy.8
In spite of the efforts made by the public
subsector –public health expenditure practically
doubled in real terms between 1990 and 1997– the
difference with the private subsector in terms of ex-
penditure per beneficiary continues to be substantial.
Thus, in 1989 the expenditure per beneficiary in the
Isapre system was three times that of FONASA,
though this difference had been halved to 1.5 times
in 1997.
The levels of contributions also display big dif-
ferences between the public and private subsectors.
In 1989 the average contribution in the Isapres was
seven times the average for FONASA, and in 1997 it
was still four times greater.
If we look at the distribution of the population
between the public and private subsectors by income
levels (table 2), we see that in the first four quintiles
of the income distribution scale most persons are
members of the public system. Only in the fifth
quintile (the richest 20% of the population) is there
majority membership of Isapres. This tendency has
been maintained throughout the 1990s.
With regard to distribution by age groups
(table 3), we see that as the age groups rise the peo-
ple in them tend to be mainly concentrated in
FONASA. Even among the richest 20% of the popula-
tion, after the age of 50 most people likewise tend to
be in FONASA.
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6 As this figure does not include co-payments made in the
private sector it underestimates global expenditure on health.
Different estimates place total spending on health at between 5
and 6% of GDP.
7 The calculations of coverage are based on the number of con-
tributors under Law No. 18.469, which in 1997 meant some
9,382,000 persons in the public system and some 3,882,000 in
the Isapres, representing altogether 90% of the population. The
remaining 10% comprises persons belonging to insurance sys-
tems with smaller coverage, such as the armed forces and the
police, and persons who do not have any health insurance.
8 Among the subsidies granted to persons enrolled in the Isapres
is the extra 2% subsidy established in 1986. This subsidy can-
not exceed 2% of a member’s taxable income and is granted as
a supplement to low-income members whose 7% contribution is
not enough to acquire a private health insurance plan. It should
be noted that this subsidy is being seriously questioned and its
elimination is currently under discussion.
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TABLE 1
Chile: Financing and coverage of health systems, 1984, 1986 and 1988-1997
1984 1986 1988 1989 1990 1991
Isapres FONASA Isapres FONASA Isapres FONASA Isapres FONASA Isapres FONASA Isapres FONASA
Sources of financing
(% of GDP) 0.4 2.9 0.7 2.4 0.9 2.1 1.2 2.1 1.4 2.1 1.5 2.2
Fiscal contribution ... 1.2 ... 0.9 ... 0.8 ... 0.7 - 0.8 - 0.9
Contributions 0.4 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.1 0.9 1.3 0.9 1.4 0.9
Co-payments ... 0.4 ... 0.3 ... 0.2 ... 0.2 ... 0.2 ... 0.2
Other revenue ... 0.3 - 0.3 - 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3
Sources of financing
(% of total) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Fiscal contribution ... 42.6 ... 38.0 ... 37.1 ... 33.6 3.2 37.8 3.1 41.8
Contributions 100.0 33.0 94.4 36.3 98.7 37.2 94.9 43.1 91.2 42.9 91.6 39.0
Co-payments ... 12.4 ... 12.5 ... 10.3 ... 8.9 ... 8.1 ... 7.2
Other revenue ... 12.0 5.6 13.2 1.3 15.5 5.1 14.5 5.6 11.2 5.2 12.0
Sources of financing
(1990=100) 18 87 35 83 58 94 84 99 100 100 115 112
Fiscal contribution ... 99 ... 84 ... 92 ... 88 100 100 113 124
Contributions 18 67 36 70 63 81 87 99 100 100 116 102
Co-payments ... 134 ... 129 ... 120 ... 108 ... 100 ... 99
Other revenue - 93 34 97 12 128 73 125 100 100 108 120
Average expenditure
per beneficiary (1997
pesos per beneficiary) 134 142 37 868 102 104 36 714 118 058 40 882 128 617 43 193 129 115 44 217 123 139 50 633
Average contribution
(1997 pesos per
contributor) 356 156 25 762 276 874 28 129 286 759 34 273 319 003 43 111 309 711 45 144 288 455 48 480
Beneficiaries (% of
total population) 3.1 83.4 7.5 79.0 11.4 77.6 13.5 76.0 16.0 73.9 19.2 71.2
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Isapres FONASA Isapres FONASA Isapres FONASA Isapres FONASA Isapres FONASA Isapres FONASA
Sources of financing
(% of GDP) 1.6 2.4 1.8 2.6 1.8 2.7 1.8 2.5 1.8 2.7 1.7 2.7
Fiscal contribution 0.1 1.1 0.1 1.2 0.1 1.2 0.1 1.2 0.1 1.3 - 1.3
Contributions 1.5 0.9 1.6 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.7 1.3 1.6 0.9
Co-payments ... 0.2 ... 0.2 ... 0.2 ... 0.2 ... 0.2 ... 0.2
Other revenue 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 - 0.3 - 0.4 - 0.3
Sources of financing
(% of total) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Fiscal contribution 3.3 43.8 4.7 45.7 4.6 46.8 4.5 48.0 3.8 48.7 2.6 49.4
Contributions 91.9 35.7 90.6 34.2 91.9 32.4 93.6 31.8 93.9 31.6 95.3 31.6
Co-payments ... 6.9 ... 6.9 ... 6.5 ... 6.6 ... 6.6 ... 6.7
Other revenue 4.8 13.6 4.7 13.3 3.5 14.3 1.9 13.6 2.3 13.1 2.1 12.3
Sources of financing
(1990=100) 133 131 154 147 167 162 184 173 196 187 197 202
Fiscal contribution 138 153 228 179 243 202 258 221 233 243 160 265
Contributions 134 109 153 118 169 123 189 129 203 138 206 149
Co-payments ... 111 ... 125 ... 132 ... 142 ... 153 ... 168
Other revenue 113 158 119 169 95 202 62 209 76 216 71 220
Average expenditure
per beneficiary (1997
pesos per beneficiary) 122 338 61 561 123 607 71 075 124 824 78 974 133 617 80 690 142 669 86 956 142 858 92 842
Average contribution
(1997 pesos per
contributor) 284 212 54 697 282 194 62 502 287 187 67 534 309 998 71 850 322 934 78 121 316 606 85 284
Beneficiaries (% of
total population) 22.1 67.5 24.8 64.8 26.2 63.3 26.5 65.1 26.4 64.5 26.5 64.1
Source: Superintendency of Isapres, Boletín Estadístico, various issues, and FONASA, Boletín Estadístico, various issues.
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TABLE 2
Chile: Distribution of population, by type of health insurance and income
(Percentage coverage)
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3
Public Isapres Resta Public Isapres Rest Public Isapres Rest
system system system
1990 85.0 2.8 12.2 78.6 6.5 14.9 69.6 11.3 19.1
1992 83.3 4.9 11.9 74.5 11.8 13.8 64.4 17.5 18.1
1994 85.7 5.9 8.4 75.3 13.8 10.9 64.6 22.3 13.1
1996 84.2 5.4 10.4 71.2 14.6 14.2 59.5 23.3 17.3
Quintile 4 Quintile 5
Public Isapres Rest Public Isapres Rest
system system
1990 57.6 21.6 20.8 36.8 41.2 22.0
1992 50.8 28.6 20.6 29.1 47.4 23.5
1994 48.8 34.4 16.8 31.0 51.4 17.6
1996 44.3 35.2 20.5 26.5 55.2 18.3
Source: CASEN Surveys for 1990, 1992, 1994 and 1996.
a Rest = Armed Forces, Private Individuals, Other Systems and Don’t Know.
TABLE 3
Chile: Distribution of population, by type of
health insurance, age and income
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3
Age Public Isapres Armed Rest a Public Isapres Armed Rest Public Isapres Armed Rest
system Forces system Forces system Forces
00-20 85.4 5.5 0.4 8.7 69.9 16.6 3.8 9.7 54.4 28.0 4.8 12.8
21-50 81.8 6.1 0.4 11.8 67.6 16.4 3.1 13.0 54.4 26.6 3.5 15.6
51-64 87.3 2.9 0.4 9.4 81.8 6.0 1.5 10.7 72.4 12.1 2.6 12.9
65 or more 89.5 0.8 0.5 9.2 91.1 1.1 0.9 6.9 89.4 1.6 2.2 6.8
Total 84.2 5.4 0.4 9.9 71.2 14.6 3.1 11.0 59.5 23.3 3.7 13.5
Quintile 4 Quintile 5
Age Public Isapres Armed Rest Public Isapres Armed Rest
system Forces system Forces
00-20 36.6 42.7 5.5 15.2 19.1 66.1 2.6 12.1
21-50 37.9 40.4 4.5 17.2 21.8 60.1 2.5 15.6
51-64 59.6 20.3 7.2 13.0 37.1 39.8 6.3 16.9
65 or more 79.4 5.9 6.1 8.7 55.5 21.8 9.8 13.0
Total 44.3 35.2 5.3 15.2 26.5 55.2 3.8 14.6
Source: CASEN Survey, 1996.
a Rest = Private Individuals, Other Systems and Don’t Know.
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As older people represent higher medical risks,
the logic of private insurance schemes will naturally
cause the insurance companies to discriminate
against this class of insurance risks, either by charg-
ing higher premiums or by reducing the levels of
coverage. This phenomenon is known in the eco-
nomic literature as “cream skimming” or skimming
off the cream. Such risk discrimination not only af-
fects the elderly but also anyone who has a higher
risk of falling sick (such as relatively older persons
or those suffering from chronic ailments) and poorer
persons. These kinds of people represent “bad risks”
for private insurance schemes. In this sense, as the
Isapres are acting as casualty insurance agents in a
highly deregulated market, they tend to behave in a
manner that encourages such discrimination.
The existence of a solidarity-based insurance
system such as FONASA, which acts as a “lender of
last resort”, together with the capacity of the Isapres
to skim off the cream, means that under the Chilean
model access to health services is determined by in-
come levels and levels of medical risk. In this con-
text, FONASA tends to concentrate those with the
lowest incomes and the highest medical risks, while
the Isapres attract people of high income and low
health risk. This segmentation of the population pro-
duced by the way the current public-private structure
operates in Chile adversely affects the equity of the
system, since the levels of per capita expenditure and
average numbers of cases of medical attention per




As noted earlier, public expenditure on health has in-
creased significantly in the 1990s. Thus, between
1990 and 1997, in real terms, this expenditure in-
creased by 100% and the fiscal contribution grew by
164%, rising from 0.8% to 1.3% of GDP (table 1).
In spite of these high growth rates of expendi-
ture, however, there are still serious deficits as re-
gards the public sector’s capacity to provide health
services for the population, and moreover most of the
health services belonging to the SNSS have problems
of finance and manning.
The main item in public health expenditure is
wages and salaries, which came to 40% of the total
in 1997 (table 4). Unfortunately, under the current
rules the wages and salaries of public employees are
not directly linked to productivity and performance
criteria, but rather to seniority, which means that pay
increases do not necessarily correspond to improve-
ments in the health services. Investment expenditure,
for its part, increased from 3.6% of total expenditure
in 1989 to 9% in 1994 and 7% in 1997. Although
this expenditure is indispensable, and also unavoid-
able in view of the state of the SNSS health services at
the end of the 1980s, it is also true in this case too
that not all the expenditure on infrastructure is auto-
matically reflected in improvements in the services
provided.9
One of the main aims in the reforms made in
Chile has been to improve the efficiency and global
management of the available resources. In view of
the chronic scarcity of financial resources affecting
the health sector, better resource allocation is crucial
for coping with the growing demands.
In the public subsector, efforts have been made
to increase resource allocation efficiency through de-
centralization policies and changes in the payment
and budgeting mechanisms of hospitals and primary
attention centres.
The processes of decentralization of the SNSS
and primary health attention begun in the 1980s were
supplemented in 1994 by the law on personnel regu-
lations for the municipalized health services. As well
as trying to improve the labour situation of these
workers, this law sought to establish management
commitments between the area health services and
the municipalities regarding the coverage of health
activities.
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9 It should be noted, however, that improvements in the infra-
structure and level of equipment make it possible to increase the
quality of the treatment provided, which does affect the average
number of days of hospitalization and the possibilities of
treating certain ailments.
Traditionally, the transfers of resources from
FONASA to the public health establishments (which
cover around 90% of the financial needs of those es-
tablishments) have been based, on the one hand, on
past budgets, mainly to cover the payment of wages
and salaries, and on the other, on a system of billing
for services rendered introduced in 1978 and de-
signed to cover expenditure on goods and services.
Investment resources are allocated from the central
level according to discretionary and rather unclear
criteria (Lenz, 1995).
This manner of distributing resources tends to
foster serious inefficiency in their allocation and
management. As the budgetary inertia rewards
higher expenditure and punishes saving (because this
would lead to future budget cuts), there are increased
incentives for increasing expenditure, regardless of
considerations of quality and appropriateness. The
system of payment and budgeting affects the quality
and cost of the services provided.
International experience reflects a growing con-
sensus on the disadvantages of retrospective pay-
ments.10 Most countries have tried to progress
towards resource allocation formulas linked with
criteria of efficiency and efficacy. Among these sys-
tems are per capita payment, payment per health epi-
sode, and diagnosis-related payment (Lenz and
Muñoz, 1995).
In the case of Chile, the changes in the mecha-
nisms for the transfer of financial resources have fol-
lowed this trend. In the establishments belonging to
the SNSS, the system of billing for services rendered
has been changed through the introduction of sys-
tems of prospective payment or payment by results.
Experiments are currently being made in the use of
diagnosis-related payment (DRP) and prospective
payment for services (PPS).
The DRP system is being applied in secondary
and tertiary-level establishments in about 17 of the
27 area health services belonging to the SNSS. This
system involves the payment of a predetermined
amount depending on the diagnosis and currently
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TABLE 4
Chile: Public expenditure on health, 1980-1997
(As a percentage of total expenditure)





1980 35.0 19.9 3.6 6.0 25.9 9.6 100.0
1981 35.8 18.2 2.6 6.7 28.9 7.8 100.0
1982 34.3 20.3 2.3 8.0 29.7 5.4 100.0
1983 34.2 22.3 0.8 6.2 28.0 8.5 100.0
1984 35.0 22.6 1.7 8.2 25.9 6.6 100.0
1985 35.4 23.0 2.3 7.2 26.3 5.9 100.0
1986 35.8 22.6 1.6 6.7 25.9 7.4 100.0
1987 36.1 25.3 2.1 9.3 20.1 7.1 100.0
1988 34.6 27.5 3.0 6.6 21.3 7.1 100.0
1989 33.3 26.0 3.5 12.3 19.0 5.8 100.0
1990 32.1 26.7 2.6 12.1 17.5 9.0 100.0
1991 33.4 28.0 2.9 12.2 16.4 7.1 100.0
1992 33.5 26.2 9.4 11.4 15.5 4.0 100.0
1993 37.0 24.5 8.0 10.6 15.0 4.8 100.0
1994 37.7 24.1 8.8 9.2 14.5 5.7 100.0
1995 39.2 25.2 8.0 9.3 14.7 3.5 100.0
1996 39.3 25.6 7.4 9.5 15.1 3.1 100.0
1997 39.9 24.9 6.5 8.9 15.6 4.3 100.0
Source: Department of Marketing, FONASA.
a Current transfers = National Supplementary Nutrition Programme + Unified Family Allowance Fund.
b Social security benefits = Subsidies + curative medical care + compensation payments.
10 Such payments include payments for services rendered, pay-
ments based on past budgets, and payments per day of attention.
covers 26 of the most frequent types of attention. For
those types of attention which do not have a prede-
termined DRP value, the PPS system of payment for
the attention actually given is used. This system cov-
ers the less frequent types of attention and those
cases where the original diagnosis made on admis-
sion subsequently involves other types of attention.
In spite of the efforts to introduce mechanisms
such as DRP and PPS, the systems of resource alloca-
tion in the public health subsector continue to oper-
ate in a bureaucratic and very inflexible manner. This
is mainly because between 70 and 80% of the re-
sources are still allocated on the basis of past budgets
and are used primarily to finance wages and salaries
in labour contexts where there is little flexibility.
For the financing of primary health attention, it
has been proposed that the system of billing for ser-
vices rendered in municipal establishments should be
replaced by a per capita system of payment.
The system of billing for services rendered in
municipal establishments in force since 1981 oper-
ates in a similar manner to the system of billing for
services rendered. The payments are made on the ba-
sis of a list of the types of attention given in munici-
pal establishments. Because of the volumes of claims
for payment made by the municipalities, a ceiling
was established for the maximum amount of such
claims in each region. The regional ceiling is in the
hands of the Intendente (governor) of each region,
who is empowered to define ceilings for each of the
communes (sub-regional divisions) under his juris-
diction (Lenz, 1995).
It is currently being proposed that the system of
billing for services rendered in municipal establish-
ments should be replaced with a system of prospec-
tive per capita payments. The amount of resources
transferred per beneficiary would depend on whether
the municipality was urban or rural and on its level
of poverty. This scheme, which is currently in opera-
tion in 310 communes, makes it possible to link the
transfer of financial resources more clearly with the
volume of treatments or consultations given and the
economic and social conditions of the municipality,
thus having a positive effect on equity.
V
The private subsector
Since the system of Isapres was set up in 1981 its
population coverage has grown rapidly. As from
1994 it stabilized at around 26% of the population,
and in 1997 it accounted for 64% of total health
insurance contributions, equivalent to 1.3% of GDP
(table 1).11
Although the Isapres have tried to expand their
universe of beneficiaries towards middle-income
sectors, their members still tend to be concentrated in
the higher levels of the income distribution scale
(table 2). Even so, the average real taxable income of
the members of open Isapres went down by 31%
between 1984 and 1997: from 442,605 pesos to
305,061 pesos at December 1997 prices (table 5).
As already noted earlier, the Isapres act as
individual risk insurance companies. Unlike
FONASA, the rules on contributions or the purchase
of insurance from these institutions do not include
solidarity-based mechanisms in matters of fi-
nance.12
The foregoing reflects the fact that equity is not
one of the objectives of the Isapre system. The argu-
ments put forward in favor of the establishment of
Isapres were based upon the pursuit of efficiency. It
was maintained that the introduction of market
mechanisms for both the provision of services and fi-
nancing which would facilitate and stimulate the ca-
pacity of users to make a choice would increase
efficiency in resource allocation in the private
subsector, with the challenges in terms of equity and
solidarity being left in the hands of the public
subsector.
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11 In 1998, for the first time since they were set up, the growth
rate of the Isapres’ portfolio was negative: in June of that year
the number of beneficiaries of the system went down by 0.6%
compared with the same period of the preceding year.
12 They do, however, display the type of solidarity typical of
risk aggregation mechanisms: i.e., between the healthy and the
sick.
International experience, like that of Chile,
shows that the imperfections in the health market
mean that efficiency gains are not ensured simply
through the free play of supply and demand.13
One of the main elements in the problem of effi-
ciency (and of course of equity) is the incentive for
risk selection in insurance markets. If the profits of
the insurers are closely related with discrimination of
risks (“skimming off the cream”), it is unlikely that
they will have much incentive to seek major gains in
efficiency. On the contrary, they will be encouraged
to avoid accepting high-risk clients rather than pro-
moting improvements in their resource management.
In the case of Chile, the current public-private
structure, together with a highly deregulated market,
has permitted and encouraged cream skimming and
the existence of substantial cross-subsidies, as we
shall see below.
Another problem associated with individual in-
surance markets is the high cost of administration
and sales. The high cost of the latter is due to the
need to compete for clients in a market of highly ho-
mogeneous products which differ little from each
other. In Chile, although the share of administration
and sales costs has been going down it is still high.
In recent years, administration and sales costs have
stabilized at around 20% of total costs (table 6).
In order to bring in greater regulation and super-
vision of the Isapre system, in 1990 the Superinten-
dency of Health Insurance Institutions was set up.
This institution is responsible for enforcing the rules
on contracts between the Isapres and users laid down
in Law No. 18,933. This law also lays down arbitra-
tion procedures for dealing with and settling disputes
between the Isapres and contributors and/or benefi-
ciaries.
In 1995 these rules were amended through Law
No. 19,381, mainly with the objective of improving
the regulatory capacity of the Superintendency and
providing greater protection for users. Among other
things, the amendments made: regulate and standard-
ize the information that the Isapres and the Superin-
tendency must provide to users; regulate the price
system for the elderly; regulate exclusions applied in
the contracts and lay down rules on pre-existing ail-
ments; regulate the way surpluses of contributions
must be managed, through individual savings ac-
counts for the workers involved; and establish a ref-
erence list of types of treatment, based on the
FONASA list (Celedón and Oyarzo, 1998). In 1997 a
“primer” was established to facilitate comparisons
between different health plans.
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TABLE 5
Chile: Evolution of average real taxable income
of Isapre members, 1984-1997
(In December 1997 pesos)
Type of Isapre
Year
Open Closed Total, whole system
1984 442 605 495 240 452 418
1985 336 392 431 760 350 142
1986 341 911 502 865 364 365
1987 305 990 456 471 321 788
1988 319 764 455 990 332 755
1989 311 725 475 954 326 208
1990 300 593 476 640 314 807
1991 287 043 486 070 300 545
1992 281 768 501 854 294 298
1993 275 126 507 368 286 254
1994 272 804 505 150 282 442
1995 294 247 514 123 302 608
1996 308 504 534 654 317 060
1997 305 061 519 334 312 782
Source: Superintendency of Isapres, Boletín Estadístico, various issues.
13 Among the market flaws are the uneven access of suppliers
and users to information and the problems of moral hazard,
adverse selection and “cream skimming”. Public insurance
systems, on the other hand, have problems of free riders.
In general terms, all these measures have been
aimed at securing greater transparency of the insur-
ance plans offered by the Isapres, but they have not
been able to overcome the problem of risk discrimi-
nation or “skimming off the cream”.
5. Fiscal aspects
Fiscal considerations were an important factor in the
decision to make reforms in the health sector. The in-
corporation of the private sector is aimed not only at
improving the efficiency of health service manage-
ment but also at making it possible to transfer part of
the expenditure costs traditionally borne by the pub-
lic health subsector to the private subsector. It is
hoped that the private subsector will be capable of
financing and providing health services for part of
the population which has depended in the past on so-
cial security and the public subsector.
For this to occur, the reforms must be capable of
shifting not only the financing but also the demand
for health services to private suppliers. Otherwise,
the State would have to cover the same health costs,
but with a lower level of income. The possibility of
securing significant shifts in demand from the public
to the private subsector is limited by the interaction
of two factors: i) the low income levels of a large
part of the population, in contrast with the upward
trends in the cost and the complexity of health atten-
tion, and ii) the practice of risk discrimination.
TABLE 6
Structure of expenditure of Isapres, 1984-1997
(In millions of pesos of each year)
Isapre
system as a 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
whole
Operating
costs 4 710 8 092 16 023 27 686 42 181 66 329 98 902 142 206 192 272 247 737 297 947 353 219 414 332 449 168
Reimburse-
ments 3 077 5 177 10 914 19 362 30 551 46 759 69 790 102 812 142 784 187 708 224 614 267 326 311 399 ...
Direct
medical
attention 210 691 1 138 2 059 1 426 1 897 2 423 4 167 5 773 6 624 6 793 6 746 7 359 ...
Preventive
medical
examinations 34 71 260 92 118 127 415 359 491 591 753 1 017 1 082 ...
Total
benefits
provided 3 321 5 939 12 312 21 513 32 095 48 784 72 628 107 338 149 048 194 924 232 160 275 089 319 840 ...
Incapacity
benefits 1 099 1 467 3 190 5 473 8 764 15 138 22 076 31 777 39 144 47 927 58 563 68 715 82 975 92 868
Other costs 290 686 521 700 1 322 2 408 4 199 3 091 4 081 4 886 7 223 9 415 11 517 13 354
Administra-
tion and
sales costs 2 394 2 916 5 277 8 262 11 115 15 959 26 089 34 495 44 622 60 888 73 479 88 127 98 276 105 490
Publicity 158 139 280 270 357 579 939 1 276 1 659 1 958 2 376 2 601 3 184 3 068
Remunera-
tion 944 937 1 965 3 047 4 669 6 020 9 843 13 010 16 779 23 609 29 117 33 739 36 805 38 894
Commissions
on sales 470 576 984 1 695 1 844 3 354 5 105 6 522 7 748 10 808 13 835 17 791 22 175 27 334
Other ex-
penditure 822 1 264 2 047 3 250 4 245 6 006 10 202 13 687 18 436 24 513 28 169 33 996 36 111 36 194
Total ex-




expenditure 66.3 73.5 75.2 77.0 79.1 80.6 79.1 80.5 81.2 80.3 80.2 80.0 80.8 81.0
Administra-
tion and sales
costs as a per-
centage of total
expenditure 26.5 24.8 23.0 20.9 19.4 20.9 19.5 18.8 19.7 19.8 20.0 19.2 19.0
Source: Superintendency of Isapres, Boletín Estadístico, various issues.
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A configuration of the mixed public-private
health system which does not shift demand to the pri-
vate subsector forces the public subsector to make
heavy expenditure to cover the population of lower
income and higher risk, while, because of the re-
forms, a substantial part of the resources obtained
from the compulsory health insurance contributions
tend to go to the private subsector.
The reform process begun in Chile in the early
1980s provides some useful lessons on this effect of
the public-private combination. It is observed that af-
ter the reforms the amounts of financial resources re-
ceived by the public and private sectors are similar,
but the private subsector covers only about 26% of
the population, whereas the public subsector is re-
sponsible for 60% of it, made up furthermore of peo-
ple with lower incomes and higher medical risks, so
that while the demand for health services has not
gone down, there has been a decline in the financial
resources from the corresponding compulsory health
contributions.
The unequal distribution of the risk portfolio be-
tween the private and public subsectors as a result of
an unsuitable public-private mix is not the only
source of pressure on the public budget. Faulty de-
sign of the institutional and regulatory framework
can give rise to problems of cross-subsidies, which
arise when beneficiaries of the private subsector
make use of public clinics and hospitals but that
subsector does not pay the public subsector for all
the cases treated. In Chile, this cross-subsidy has
been estimated at around 15 billion pesos per year:
close to 4% of public health expenditure and to 2.7%
of the total expenditure of the Isapres.
VI
Challenges of the reforms
The reform experiences which may be observed in
the region and elsewhere reflect particular features of
the actual situations involved. There are, however,
some common elements which define their general
thrust: i) separation of the functions of financing and
providing health services; ii) an increase in users’ ca-
pacity to select suppliers and, in some cases, insur-
ers; iii) promotion of competition among suppliers
and among insurers, and iv) stronger regulatory and
supervisory mechanisms.
Although the reforms applied in Chile do incor-
porate several of these elements, the mixed health
system which arose from the reforms displays seri-
ous problems of efficiency and equity. The pub-
lic-private combination tends to give rise to serious
cases of inequity as regards access to services and
their quality, as well as problems of efficiency and
resource management at both the public and private
levels.
One of the main challenges facing the Chilean sys-
tem is that of transforming the current public-private
combination, which calls for the restructuring of the
systems of financing and provision of health services.
On the financing side, the main tasks still re-
maining to be done are to introduce solidarity mech-
anisms into the rules on contributions to the private
health insurance system and to design instruments to
discourage risk discrimination. This discrimination is
encouraged by the fact that private health risk insur-
ance exists side by side with a solidarity-based pub-
lic health insurance system and that there are few
regulatory instruments in the Chilean health market.
The need to maintain solidarity of financing in
schemes which compete with each other has been a
concern of many health system reform processes. In
the Latin American context the experience of Colom-
bia is worthy of note, while in Europe that of the
Netherlands is likewise noteworthy. Both these sys-
tems form part of organizational schemes that pursue
what is termed “managed competition”. Some pro-
posals have been put forward along these lines for
Chile (Aedo, 1997; Larrañaga, 1997).
The challenge that must be met is how to recon-
cile the existence of risk insurance with mechanisms
designed to secure solidarity in financing: i.e., how
to ensure that the health insurance contributions paid
by subscribers are not determined by their level of
medical risk, in circumstances where the income re-
ceived by the insurance companies is adjusted ac-
cording to their risk portfolios, in order thus to
reduce the incentive for the insurers to concentrate
on the low-risk population.
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Generally speaking, health systems based on
managed competition schemes tend to be organized
on the basis of a solidarity fund responsible for dis-
tributing subsidies to offset the differing individual
risks, so that each member contributes as a function
of his income and the insurance companies receive
payment as a function of their risk portfolio. The sol-
idarity fund is the body responsible for compensating
the insurers for the differences that may exist be-
tween their risk portfolios.
In addition to establishing a solidarity fund, it is
also necessary to introduce such instruments as man-
datory health insurance, to define basic health pack-
ages, to regulate the cost of the insurance premiums
and to ensure serious supervision and regulation by
the authorities in general. The aim of a basic or inte-
grated package is not to reduce the levels of coverage
of the insured persons but to ensure a similar level of
health service coverage for all, regardless of their
contributions. It is also useful for making insurance
plans more homogeneous and helping to determine
the scales of prices for medical attention.14
These instruments must form part of a regula-
tory scheme which promotes competition. They are
not forms of regulation designed to avoid such com-
petition but seek instead to overcome the market
flaws typical of a competitive environment.
The application of mechanisms theoretically de-
signed to combat the problem of “cream skimming”
does not guarantee that this phenomenon will indeed
be brought under control, for the lack of the neces-
sary institutions in imperfect health markets makes
this problem difficult to counter.15
In the provision of health services, the public-
private configuration also gives rise to problems of
inefficiency and poor resource management.
Firstly, the very limited interaction between public
and private suppliers has led to inefficiency in
global resource allocation. Secondly, in spite of all
the efforts made to improve allocation mechanisms
within the public subsector, this subsector still suf-
fers from a bureaucratic structure, with serious ri-
gidities in the way it handles financial transfers to
the area services of the SNSS, so that there is little
incentive to improve the efficiency and efficacy of
expenditure.
International experience shows that, in view of
the asymmetry of information and the difficulty users
have in processing the information needed to make a
proper choice of their suppliers, there is a tendency
to adopt systems which restrict the free choice of
suppliers. These systems are based on the concept of
a “gatekeeper”: a family doctor who makes a first di-
agnosis and then if necessary directs the patients to
more specialized services. In order to avoid problems
of collusion between these family doctors and the
suppliers of specialized services there must be a high
degree of competition among such doctors.
VII
Conclusions
The reforms begun in the early 1980s in Chile have
significantly changed the structure of the health sec-
tor, combining the public and private subsectors for
the financing and supply of health services.
Among the main issues that need to be ad-
dressed are, on the one hand, the need to create soli-
darity-based financing mechanisms in the context of
the private insurance schemes and, on the other, the
need to avoid the risk discrimination which takes
place in the Isapre system. Although the latter is an
inherent problem in risk insurance, it tends to be en-
couraged by the design of the current public-private
configuration.
The effects on equity deriving from the introduc-
tion of the system of insurance schemes in the health
market depend more on the nature of the contribu-
REFORMS TO HEALTH SYSTEM FINANCING IN CHILE • DANIEL TITELMAN
C E P A L R E V I E W 6 9 • D E C E M B E R 1 9 9 9 197
14 This is without prejudice to the right of individuals to acquire
broader coverage, in terms of the types of attention covered or
the quality of their hospital accommodation, by taking out
voluntary insurance plans.
15 After the reform of the health insurance system in the Nether-
lands, the difficulty of implementing the system of risk-adjusted
payments has led to the insurance companies only taking re-
sponsibility for 3% of the difference between their real costs and
the costs used to define the risk-adjusted per capita payments.
The remaining 97% is reimbursed retrospectively by the solidar-
ity fund, through a system of compensation for losses.
tions and the rules governing them, as well as on the
degree of deregulation of the market, than on
whether those schemes are public or private.
In this connection, there are examples, both in
the international context and in the region itself, of
what is called “managed competition”. These cases,
unlike the Chilean model, seek to introduce private
insurance systems with elements of solidarity-based
financing, in order to avoid the problem of risk dis-
crimination.
Nevertheless, one of the objectives of the Chil-
ean system in the short term is to strengthen the ca-
pacity of the Superintendent of Isapres to develop
prudential regulation instruments for the private in-
surance market. These instruments would make it
possible to rationalize the supply of medical insur-
ance, since the current diversity of such supply gives
rise to many problems in terms of efficiency. The
high levels of expenditure on administration and
sales displayed by the Isapre system are also fre-
quently questioned. Although this expenditure has
tended to go down somewhat, it is still felt to be rela-
tively high.
Because of the lack of a fluid and transparent re-
lationship between the public and private suppliers,
the supply side of the health service market has be-
come segmented, thus giving unsuitable incentives
for the development of the supplier institutions.
This segmentation of supply has given rise to
cross subsidies due to the services which are ren-
dered by the public sector to Isapre beneficiaries but
are not reimbursed to that sector by the Isapres. Be-
cause of the high cost that these subsidies involve for
the public sector, they must be eliminated in order
to achieve a more efficient system of insurance
and services. It may be noted that the efforts made
by FONASA to improve its data bases have enabled
it to tackle this problem to some extent, by increas-
ing the capacity of the public services to collect
charges from users who are members of the Isapre
system.
In the public health subsector, reforms have been
made in order to promote the allocation of resources
on the basis of results and performance (the DRP and
PPS systems). These efforts are still only very recent,
however, and cover only a small percentage of public
resources, as nearly 70% of the budget is for the pay-
ment of wages and salaries. One of the challenges
which remains to be solved is that of giving the SNSS
greater labour flexibility and a scale of remuneration
based on productivity.
It is also important to strengthen FONASA’s ca-
pacity to act as a supervisory agency for users of the
public system and to improve its performance in its
roles as collector and allocator of resources and as a
health insurance system.
Finally, in order to make reforms in health sys-
tems it is essential to have the necessary political
consensus. In the case of Chile, apart from the diag-
nostic studies made of health sector dynamics it has
not been possible to establish a political consensus
that would allow vigorous progress in the substantive
reforms needed by the system. In view of the com-
plexity of the technical and value-related aspects of
the sector, such a consensus is important not only for
initiating reform processes but also for ensuring that
they have lasting effects.
(Original: Spanish)
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